The IPOs of the Electricity/Internal Combustion revolution created more lasting value than the IPOs of the IT revolution. Stock-market data point to two explanations for this. First, computer prices have been falling much faster than did those of electricity and internal combustion in the 1890-1930 period, and so the value of each generation of computer-intensive entrants is reduced by later entrants. And, second, the pre-1973 vintages reacted to the microcomputer relatively quickly, perhaps because the threat of being taken over is now higher than it was 70-100 years ago.
Introduction
In 116 years of U.S. stock-market history we look for evidence of extended periods of creative destruction. It seems to us that the periods 1890-1930 and 1971-2001 saw more creative destruction than the period . The Þrst epoch saw the rise of electricity and the internal combustion engine, while the second epoch is that of the microcomputer and information technology. One way to measure progress is by how much cheaper a technology becomes. Electricity, internal combustion and -most dramatically -computing all became much cheaper over the periods in question. This is shown by the price indexes displayed in Figure 1 . 
{FIGURE 2 HERE}
The dashed line in Figure 2 is real non-residential private investment from 1885 to 2001 plotted as the share of this total attributable to each year. In a one-sector 2 world in which every Þrm Þnanced its start-up with a stock issue and then simply kept up its capital and paid for all parts and maintenance out of its proÞts, each Þrm's current value would be proportional to its initial investment, and the solid and dashed lines would coincide. Using the ratio of the areas under the solid and dashed lines in Figure 2 as an estimate of the relative gap between market value and the start-up investment that produced it, we Þnd a ratio of 3.26 for the '20s compared to 1.20 and 2.12 for the '50s and '60s. Surprisingly, the ratios are only 0.88 and 0.75 for the '80s and '90s. This is puzzling since the computer price index has been falling much faster than the other two indexes in Figure 1 .
Relative to investment, why do the '20s account for so much more than the '90s?
Several explanations come to mind:
1. Organization capital : The entrants of the '20s created "organization capital" that was hard to hire away or imitate by subsequent generations, whereas the subsequent vintages did not. This is an unlikely explanation since teamwork and other components of organization capital probably matter more for new technologies than for the old. 
4.
More total investment after 1970? Had the rate of investment been higher after 1971 than before, one could expect that the average quality of that investment may have been smaller as relatively poorer projects were undertaken. But the investment rate was not that much higher after 1970 than before, and so this explanation does not work either. 
Market power:
The IT vintages are more computer intensive, and Figure 1 shows that the price of their capital has been plummeting. A fall in markups 3 on old capital induced by the cheapening of new capital is the most likely explanation for the under-performance of the IT-era vintages.
{FIGURE 3 HERE}
The puzzle of the late '60s is due partly to how we treated the en masse addition of NASDAQ to the CRSP Þles in 1972. We reassigned this artiÞcial spike back, but most of it only a few years back because most of the NASDAQ Þrms were, in 1972, only a few years old. In Figure 3 we consider versions of the solid line in Figure 2 that would obtain if none of the entering AMEX and NASDAQ Þrms were assigned to earlier years. The solid (top) line in Figure 3 is the same as in Figure • Electricity. Two of today's giants, General Electric (listed in 1892) and AT&T • Internal Combustion Engine. General Motors listed on the NYSE in 1917 and accounted for more than 4 percent of stock market value by 1931. Caterpillar and Boeing produced the gas-driven tractor and airplane.
• Computer/IT : Firms at the core of the IT revolution, such as Intel, Microsoft, and Amazon, quickly rose to prominence.
This discussion does not explain the '60s. What, then, were the sectors that led the way in terms of IPO activity in the key decades? Table 1 conÞrms that entry in the '20s and '90s were driven by technology: Utilities such as electricity led in the '20s, and services (including health and professional) and communications technologies rose to preeminence in the '90s. The '60s have machinery (including office equipment) and chemicals as the leading sectors.
{TABLE 1 HERE}

Replacement among the leaders
In Hopenhayn (1982) , when an industry is in a long-run stochastic equilibrium, the age distribution of an industry's leadership is invariant. That is, the average age of, say, the top 5% or top 10% of the Þrms is Þxed. Some leaders hold on to their positions and this tends to make the leading group older, but others are replaced by younger Þrms, and this has the opposite effect. In equilibrium the two forces offset one another and the age of the leadership stays the same. Keeping the age of the leaders ßat requires, in other words, constant replacement.
{FIGURE 4 AND FIGURE 5 HERE}
Figures 4 and 5 show that, overall, the age of the leaders is anything but ßat.
It sometimes rises faster than the 45 0 line, indicating that the age of the leaders is rising faster than the passage of time. At other times it is ßat or falling, indicating replacement. Both Þgures show, however, that during the electricity and the IT revolutions, the lines are ßat or falling, so that replacement was then high. This is best seen in Figure 5 . 
Small vs. large Þrms
If "creative destruction" does indeed mean that old Þrms give way to young Þrms, then we should see signs of it in Figure 6 , which depicts the relative appreciation of total market value of small versus large Þrms since 1885 with NBER recessions shaded. We deÞne "small" Þrms as those in the lowest quintile of CRSP, and "large"
Þrms as those in the upper quintile. The Þgure shows that small Þrms outperform large ones in the long run and that the growth premium is about 7.5 percent per year.
But the two technological epochs do not show a faster rise than the other epochs, and this is puzzling. The IT episode shows, in particular, that the large Þrms regrouped 7 Data Appendix Figure 1 .-We describe the data and methodology for constructing the price indexes in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, footnotes 3, 5, and 6, pp. 350-351) . CRSP Þrms, and are described in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001b) . The "5 percent"
and "ten percent" groups actually account for more than these shares of stock market capitalization because we add Þrms to each group until the thresholds are passed. update an index number for that quintile that is set to unity in 1885. We re-form the quintiles in each year. Figure 6 is the quotient of the small and large cap indexes. 
